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Our society has become, within an incredibly short fifty years, a society
of institutions. It has become a pluralist society in which every major social
task has been entrusted to large organizations--from producing economic
goods and services to health care, from social security and welfare to educa-
tion, from the search for new knowledge to the protection of the natural
environment.
This observation is fast becoming part of the "conventional wisdom"; the
fact that Peter Drucker's book is on the nonfiction bestseller lists indicates the
central place which the bureaucratization of modem life occupies in contempo-
rary social policy debates.2 Over one-half of our gross national product comes
from service institutions which are not businesses and consequently not subject
to market control State, local, and federal governments alone comprise one-
third of the GNP.' Drucker dramatically warns that "the alternative to auton-
omous institutions that function and perform is not freedom. It is totalitarian
tyranny." 5
The national concern over bureaucratization has failed to infiltrate legal
scholarship; administrative law scholars have generally addressed only the
peripheral legal problems which omnipresent public bureaucracies create.
While government bureaucracies such as the police, public housing authorities,
prisons, county hospitals, social security offices, and public welfare agencies take
thousands of illegal actions each day, the administrative law casebooks concern
themselves almost exclusively with the actions of major federal regulatory
agencies, and of those only "ones which ultimately generate lawsuits traditional
in form."' There are only 10,000 employees of the seven major federal regulatory
agencies; yet 420,000 policemen daily make administrative decisions which affect
the lives of millions of citizens.7 Public social welfare agencies disbursed $64.3
billion in benefits in 1970; 23 million citizens wait monthly for pension checks
from Social Security or other government retirement programs; another 15 mil-
lion depend upon public welfare agencies.' It is not unfair to conclude that the
traditional administrative law focus is egregiously myopic.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law.
1 P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT iX (1973).
2 E.g., J. GALBRArrH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); EcoNomics AND THE PUB-
LIC PURPOSE (1973).
3 P. DRucKER, supra note 1, at 7.
4 Id. at 7.
5 Id. at ix.
6 L. JAPFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 5 (3d ed. 1968).
7 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 8 (1969).
8 S. CooPEa, ET AL., LAW AND PovEaRv: CASES AND MATERIALS 30-31 (2d ed. 1973).
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As to how fairly these "consumers" of public bureaucracies are treated, one
study of social security disability claims showed that the odds against getting a
fair determination were quite substantial.' Thirty-seven percent of the disability
applicants who were originally denied but requested "reconsideration" at a
higher agency level were found eligible; 43 percent of those who were originally
denied and also denied during the "reconsideration" process were subsequently
found eligible by a hearing examiner. Almost 40 percent of those who were
denied at all levels of the agency (including the hearing examiner and a National
Appeals Council) and yet who had the stamina to seek judicial review were
found by a federal district court to have been the victims of administrative
error." What makes these rates of bureaucratic error so alarming is that they
stem from the administration of a "middle class" social insurance program where
administrators are ostensibly much more client-oriented than in poor people's
programs such as public welfare."
Some legal scholars have addressed the issue, but their proposals for reform
consist only of such traditional administrative law techniques as rule-making and
judicial review.' 2 Such techniques, while useful, are inadequate to control low-
level administrative discretion since they fail to take into account the dynamic
forces determining bureaucratic behavior.'
Legal services attorneys have spent much time litigating against public
bureaucracies. However, for the most part (and almost entirely in the welfare
area) these lawsuits have been structured to strike down legal rules. Unfortu-
nately, the rule has often been struck down but the practice has continued un-
abated because the rule reflected institutional pressures which continue to exist
with or without the rule.'
This commentary suggests new mechanisms designed to ensure the respon-
siveness of public bureaucracies to their clientele. An attempt will be made to
construct a model of bureaucratic behavior for one public bureaucracy-welfare
-and then to draw from that analysis new forms of legal control which better
conform to the dynamic of the bureaucratic structure.
9 Dixon, The Welfare State and Mass Justice: A Warning from the Social Security Dis-
ability Program, 1972 DuKE L.J. 681, 683.
10 Id.
11 Friedman, Social Welfare Legislation: An Introduction, 21 STAN. L. REV. 217 (1969).
12 K. DAVIS, supra note 7; Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudica-
tion and Enforcement, 72 CoLuM. L. REV. 1293 (1972).
13 Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, in LAw OF THE POOR
(J. tenBroek ed. 1966).
14 Gary Bellow has stated the problem well:
For example, a group of farm workers tells me that, in essence, they want the
disease and injury rates from pesticides to be reduced substantially. There exist laws
on the books; the agency does not, however, enforce these laws or enforces them so
selectively that enforcement has no effect on the practice. The problem is the creation
of a mechanism that can create a substantial and lasting change in behavior, govern-
mental and private. This is inevitably a political as well as a legal problem. We can
try to generate pressures on the parties involved by bringing public attention to the
problem, or try to develop sanctions for non-compliance with existing laws or attempt
to develop institutional mechanisms to keep the problem visible. Sometimes we can
achieve these results with a lawsuit. Sometimes a legal decision can produce conform-
ing behavior. But, what happens when we go away - when the pressure abates?
Legal victories can be so easily circumvented. If one avenue is blocked, five other
alternatives remain open.
Quoted in Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1087 n.28 (1970).
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While the discussion centers on welfare, many of the principles also apply
to other public bureaucracies such as social security and unemployment in-
surance. Indeed, students are the "consumers" of schools, patients of hospitals,
tenants of public housing, prisoners of prisons, and the community of police
services. Each bureaucracy presents unique problems but each shares one com-
mon characteristic: there is no market control of the "seller's" behavior; the
dissatisfied customer cannot bring his trade elsewhere. Society in general, and
lawyers as the architects of our social institutions in particular, must therefore
create controls which will ensure the responsiveness of public bureaucracies.
II. The Varieties of Administrative Abuse
It has become increasingly clear that the administration of our national
welfare system does not proceed .on a mechanical model, efficiently churning out
uniform grants and services on the basis of universal requirements and policies.
Numerous studies have shown that administration varies not only from state to
state 5 but also between local agencies in the same state, 6 between different
offices in the same local unit,"7 and between different caseworkers in the same
office.' While important variations are permitted between states, the variations
from locality to locality, office to office, and worker to worker are clearly forbid-
den by the Social Security Act. 9
This commentary does not wish to portray caseworkers as ogres. Welfare
caseworkers, like legal service attorneys and law professors,"0 are a mixed group,
some conscientious and some inept. Our welfare system, however, gives enormous
discretion to all low-level administrators, and then exposes them to anticient
pressures while insulating them from proclient pressures. The resulting active
abuses such as midnight raids2 are dramatic, but perhaps the passive abuse of
withdrawing as much as possible from recipients and their needs is a more
serious problem.2 What follows is not an exhaustive catalogue of administrative
abuses; it should, however, illustrate the potential for abuse and the variety of
low visibility techniques which can be employed to illegally limit the number of
recipients and the amounts they receive.
A. Applications-The Problem of Discouragement
One effective way to limit applications is to refuse to publicize the existence
of a program. We have all seen public service spots on television encouraging
15 A. KEITH-LUCAS, DECISIONS ABOUT PEOPLE IN NEED 179 (1957).
16 Derthick, Intercity Differences in Administration of the Public Assistance Program:
The Case of Massachusetts, in CITY POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 243 (J. Wilson ed. 1968).
17 Graham, Civil Liberties Problems in Welfare Administration, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 836,
848 (1968).
18 A. KrrH-LuCAS, supra note 15, at 37.
19 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3) (1970).
20 Perhaps some study should be done on the "responsiveness" of legal service attorneys to
their clients (or of law professors to their students). The same lack of '"market controls" which
will be discussed in this commentary also exists in legal aid and law school bureaucracies.
21 E.g., Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 425 P.2d 223
(1967).
22 Handler & Hollingsworth, Reforming Welfare: The Constraints of the Bureaucracy and
the Clients, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1167, 1176 (1970).
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inquiries about social security and veterans' benefits, but certainly never an in-
vitation to unwed mothers to inquire about possible eligibility for AFDG s3 Also,
the potential recipient who does come to the welfare office may be greeted by a
wide variety of ambiences, some overtly hostile. A welfare office in a rural
California county with which the author had many dealings was situated on the
second floor of a modern office building. A sign on the elevator directed welfare
recipients to use the stairs. After checking in with the receptionist, the potential
client was sent to a room containing only long rows of straight-back chairs, all
facing one wall. No ashtrays were provided.
Merely limiting the number of staff and telephones implicitly limits case-
loads. This same office, which served over 15,000 recipients, had only four
telephone lines; probably half the eligible population in the county spoke Spanish,
but the telephone receptionist spoke only English. Since most recipients had to
use pay phones and many lived 15 to 20 miles from the office, the disincentive
to apply was considerable.
The caseworker interviewing the potential recipient also has the option of
classifying the request as an inquiry rather than an application, thereby saving the
potential recipient (and the caseworker) the bother of filling out a formal
application.24 Even if a formal application is accepted, the primary burden of
steering it through the bureaucratic rapids rests with the applicant.2 s If he stops
at any time during the process, the application will lapse. Amassing records may
require several trips to the agency and the amount of support the applicant
receives from the caseworker will undoubtedly determine whether the application
is ever completed.
In this regard, the availability of emergency aid becomes extremely im-
portant. The Social Security Act does not require it, but most states provide for
emergency aid to help families in immediate need since the federal government
shares the cost.26 Because most applicants come to welfare as the last resort in
a crisis and the eligibility determination and issuance of the first check may take
several weeks, most recipients need and have a right to this immediate payment.r
Many never receive it; frequently they never even hear of its existence. As a
consequence they may well resolve the immediate crisis in some other way (per-
haps by borrowing from family or friends) and allow the application to lapse.
B. Eligibility Requirements-The Problem of Vagueness
Our welfare policy has a split personality: it both purports to be eager to
23 For a long time the actual recipients of welfare were about one-half of those actually
eligible; the publicity which community action and welfare rights groups gave the program
may explain the sudden jump in participation rates in the late 60's. See Steiner, Reform
Follows Reality: The Growth of Welfare, 34 Pun. INTEREST 47, 64 (1974).
24 California Department of Benefit Payments Reg. § 40-103.6 (hereinafter cited as
"CDBP Reg.").
25 "In the initiation of an application for assistance . . . the applicant shall assume as
much responsibility as he can ... " CDBP Reg. § 40-105.
26 42 U.S.C.§ 606(e) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 233.120 (1973); CDBP Reg. § 40-129.
27 CDBP Reg. § 40-129 recognizes "immediate need" when the applicant's "current income
and/or liquid resources are insufficient to meet his expenses for food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, or other nondeferrable needs during the period of evaluation."
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help the truly needy and yet fiercely resolves not to waste tax dollars on malinger-
ers. It resolves this dilemma by vaguely worded eligibility requirements giving
the caseworker maximum discretion to include or exclude.2 8 The Supreme Court
has struck down some of the more outrageous requirements, 9 but the same abuses
in different forms remain.
One statutory requirement for AFDC eligibility is that the child be "de-
prived of parental support.""0  One form of deprivation is the "continued
absence" of one parent. California regulations define "continued absence" as a
"substantial severance of marital and family ties" and further define "substantial
severance" as a "definite interruption of or marked reduction in marital and
family responsibilities compared to previously existing conditions."'" A case-
worker must apply this broad standard to real life situations; sometimes it is
done harshly. For instance, the author once had a client who lived in a border
town and brought her children every Sunday morning to a park on the Mexican
side so they could see their father who was an excluded alien. The welfare de-
partment was not sure this amounted to continued absence.
The Supreme Court has recently ruled that the Social Security Act does not
prevent the states from having supplementary "work programs."3 2 California
requires "employable" recipients to go through a whole panoply of procedures
purportedly designed to lead to employment. One requirement is that the
"employable" recipient "shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the county that
he has been, and is available for, and actively seeking employment." 33 This, of
course, is not an unreasonable requirement so long as the recipient is indeed
"employable"3 " and there is some reasonable hope of finding work. Often, how-
ever, this is not true of unskilled welfare recipients in California in the 1970's;
the consequence is that welfare administrators may use this job search require-
ment as a club. One winter the author spoke with a young man in a northern
California rural county, heavily dependent on the logging industry which closed
down in winter. Each day this young man walked to one of the five to ten gas
stations in town to inquire about work. He would walk to one station a day,
five days a week, in two-week cycles, so he could fill out his job search card. He
knew there was no work, so did the gas station operators and so, presumably,
did the welfare department, but they insisted on this demeaning ritual if his wife
and baby were to continue to receive benefits. In the same county, the author
also spoke with a middle-aged woman who, about twice weekly, drove at her own
expense about 20 miles round trip to inquire about maid jobs at motels, even
though she knew they were not hiring during the slow winter season.
The California work rule is especially vulnerable to abuse since it holds that
a recipient can fail in his or her job search duty by "adopting voluntary personal
28 W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 181 (1965).
29 E.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
30 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
31 CDBP Reg. § 41-450.
32 New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
33 CDBP Reg. § 41-407.
34 E.g., CDBP Reg. § 40-407.27 exempts "a caretaker whose presence in the house is re-




appearance factors or a bizarre mode of dress shown not to be acceptable to
prospective employers in light of the labor market of the registrant."3 One
young man in a California central coastal county was questioned about the
"suitability" of his long hair (held neatly in a ponytail with a rubber band)
before he was sent to apply for work at a local cannery.
C. Grant Computations-The Problem of Complexity
AFDC, of course, is only available to children who are needy. 6 This
requires an inquiry into an applicant's income and assets.
The spectre of affluent loafers on the public dole has spawned an extremely
complex set of regulations pertaining to income and property. The California
welfare manual devotes 40 pages to the subject of income alone. The result is
a system which generates abuse because of its own complexity and the resulting
ignorance of both recipient and caseworker.
The concept of "in-kind income," for example, would befuddle an educated
person, much less an undereducated welfare recipient. "In-kind income" is the
"noncash economic benefit" which California regulations impute to recipients
who share facilities with other recipients or nonrecipients. If two welfare re-
cipients with separate grants live in one house, the state reasons there is a saving
which is income to one of the recipients and deducted from the grant." If a non-
needy grandparent allows needy grandchildren who receive AFDC to live in his
home, the value of the lodging he gives them is income.' Even the value of the
nourishment and shelter provided to the fetus by its mother is income to be
deducted from the grant. 9
The average recipient certainly cannot protect his or her rights under such
a system. Even legal services attorneys who do not specialize in welfare feel ill at
ease checking a budget computation. One suspects that the rapid turnover in
welfare personnel, together with the desire to free more experienced personnel
from "paper work," creates a situation in which all too often the caseworker
computing the budget is ignorant of the applicable law.
D. Offsets, Recoupment, and Fraud-The Problems of
Presumptions and Punishments
Not only is the welfare system complex, but the administrator has great
power to impose sanctions against the recipient who is ignorant of his duties
with respect to the system. A series of convenient presumptions unfairly increases
that power. In California, a recipient is presumed to be aware of all eligibility
conditions and his duty to report relevant information.4" If he fails to report, his
35 CDBP Reg. § 30-152.23.
36 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
37 Cooper v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 115 Cal. Rptr. 1, 524 P.2d 97 (1974).
38 Waits v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 887, 115 Cal. Rptr. 21, 524 P.2d 117 (1974).
39 C.W.R.O. v. Brian, 11 Cal. 3d 237, 113 Cal. Rptr. 154, 520 P.2d 971 (1974). It
should be noted that Cooper, Waits, and G.W.R.O. each repudiated the "in-kind income"
thesis as a violation of state law.
40 CDBP Reg. § 44-333.14.
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failure is "presumed to be willful" unless the recipient rebuts the presumption.'
The recipient is guilty until he proves himself innocent to the satisfaction of the
caseworker.
The same type of presumption is used in the job search program; a recipient
can be terminated not for refusing a job offer but for failure "to demonstrate to
the county" that he has been looking for a job. The burden of proof is placed on
the recipient, thereby increasing administrator's discretionary power over the
recipient.
Of course, if a recipient disagrees with a caseworker's reduction of the
grant, he can ask for a hearing and receive the original amount of aid until a
hearing is granted and a decision announced; this is the mandate of Goldberg v.
Kelly.4 2 However, if the hearing officer upholds the caseworker's determination,
federal regulations now permit the department to recoup the resulting overpay-
ment, often by a deduction from the current grant. 3 This procedure requires
the recipient in effect to wager that his position will be upheld.
The final source of power lies in the caseworker's ability to recommend a
fraud prosecution which can be used as a bill collection technique of great
efficacy.4 4 Once again, a personal anecdote illustrates the problem. One day a
farmworker came to my office because he was being investigated for fraud. The
county welfare fraud investigator had told him he would be prosecuted if he did
not repay all the aid he had received. The client had obviously failed to report a
good deal of casual income. He claimed ignorance of the requirement; perhaps,
he said, the fact that the caseworker spoke only English and he only Spanish
caused the problem. I told him he only had a legal duty to repay if he had with-
held the information willfully. He said he had not, and that he did not have any
money anyway. I told him to plead not guilty if he had, in fact, done nothing
wrong. He went to trial, was convicted and went to jail for three months. Today
I would advise such a client to make some financial arrangement with the
county whether or not he was innocent. The fraud prosecution is necessary, but
its potential for abuse is enormous. Too often the only pressures which operate
on the administrator considering a fraud prosecution induce him to use it as an.
economy device rather than for its intended purpose.
III. The Bureaucratic Dynamic
A. Informal Structure, Power, and Self-Interest
A basic premise of this commentary is that lawyers have an inadequate
understanding of the nature of bureaucracy and the motives of bureaucratic
officials. While lawyers certainly no longer subscribe to Max Weber's portrayal
of bureaucracy as the most rational and efficient form of organization, they do
tend to stereotype bureaucrats as "pencil pushers" without the ability and ambi-
tion necessary to succeed in a more demanding profession. Most lawyers' knowl-
41 CDBP Reg. § 44-333.161.
42 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
43 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (12) (1973), amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 22268-69 (1974).
44 CDBP Reg. § 20-001 et seq.
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edge of organization theory is limited to Parkinson's Law and perhaps some
acquaintance with Robert Merton's concept of "ritualism," a process in an ossified
bureaucracy where "adherence to rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes
transformed into an end-in-itself," and "instrumental" values become "terminal"
values.45
Social scientists no longer center the study of bureaucracy on the static
organization chart, but view it as a dynamic system of force and counterforce4 6
No longer are bureaucratic officials portrayed as timid simpletons; administrators
are recognized as ambitious, aggressive individuals looking to their own self-
interest. The insights of these social scientists should aid lawyers in understanding
the bureaucracies they seek to reform.
One concept developed in this literature is "informal structure," the pattern
of relationships which develop in an organization parallel to and often in conflict
with the formal hierarchical structure. Bureaucracies are thus viewed in terms of
the actual conduct of their officials rather than the formal description of their
duties. A study of a public employment office found that many of the formal
regulations of the agency had been informally amended in practice because they
were found inefficient or inconvenient by the people actually performing the
tasks.4"
Anthony Downs sees these informal structures as reactions by employees
against management's penchant for viewing workers as objects rather than as
whole persons.48 Such structures often divert the bureau's members "from
achieving the formal purposes of the bureau to manipulating conditions of power,
income, and prestige within the bureau."4 9
This type of dysfunction is not inevitable. Bureaucrats are "significantly
motivated by their own self-interest" ;5" therefore, a properly structured organiza-
tion could marshal the "informal structure" in support of its formal goals. Blau's
study of the public employment office gives a simple but striking example of this
phenomenon. The agency's formal regulations gave weight both to counselling
job applicants and to referring applicants to jobs for which they were qualified.
At first, the statistical records from which the interviewers' job performance eval-
uations were made listed only the number of referrals made. Consequently,
interviewers spent little time in counselling and made large numbers of referrals,
many to jobs they knew the applicants would not obtain. Later the statistics were
changed to reflect not only the number of referrals but also the percentage of re-
ferrals which resulted in jobs. A marked change was immediately noticed in the
interviewers' conduct toward fewer total referrals but to jobs which the referree
had an excellent chance to obtain. The formal regulations remained the same,
but the agency brought interviewee conduct closer to the agency's formal goals
45 R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 253 (rev. ed. 1968).
46 P. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1955); P. BLAU & W. SCOTT, FORMAL
ORGANIZATIONS (1962); M. CROZIER, THE BURAuCRATIC PHENOMENON (1964); A. DOWNS,
INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967); G. TULLOCI, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1965).
47 P. BLAU, supra note 46, at 24-26.
48 A. DowNs, supra note 46, at 63.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 2.
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by more closely identifying the interviewers' self-interest with those goals.5'
Michel Crozier relies heavily on the concepts of power and discretion in his
study of two French bureaucracies, one a public agency performing clerical
functions for the public and therefore in many ways resembling a welfare agency.
Following Robert Dahl, Crozier defines power as the ability to cause another to
take an action he otherwise would not have taken. 2 Crozier maintains that
bureaucracies are best understood not as hierarchical, formal structures but as a
series of power relationships. Moreover, power requires dependence which in
turn requires discretion. Discretion permits one to bargain as to the course of
action he will choose; one cannot bargain if he has no discretion to choose
between alternatives. Crozier found that supervisors in the agencies he studied
in fact had no power over subordinates because rigid work rules left them no
discretion. A supervisor with discretion to selectively enforce work rules would
wield considerable power.5" Since discretion is the source of power, Crozier
believes that a continuing battle takes place within the agency with each occupa-
tional group attempting to maximize its discretion in dealing with its subordinates
and simultaneously to limit its supervisor's discretion in dealing with it.54 Blau
and Scott's welfare study indirectly supports this thesis; it showed that welfare
caseworkers who on every other index showed themselves "pro-client" were less
willing than their "anti-client" colleagues to see a previously caseworker-deter-
mined special needs figure made part of the basic grant. They evidently wanted
the discretion to give or withhold this bonus. Blau also found that interviewers
in the public employment office used their discretion to impose sanctions to
control "uncooperative" job applicants. 5
B. The Caseworker as Broker
At this point, three observations can be made: (1) We should pay more
attention to the actual conduct of welfare officials and less to formal structure
and written procedures; (2) welfare agencies are fields of power relationships
with the amount of discretion in large part determining one's bargaining power;
and (3) bureaucratic officials are not necessarily ideologically pro- or anticlient
but in large part are self-interested brokers between competing influences. 6
Therefore, a study of the influences or inputs which weigh on an official's decision
should prove helpful in attempting to control welfare abuse. The following
discussion views the influences which weigh on a caseworker decision; the case-
worker's vantage point has been chosen partly out of necessity (an analysis of all
the roles in a welfare bureaucracy would be unwieldy) but also because the low
visibility of caseworker decisions makes them especially inappropriate for tradi-
51 P. BLAU, supra note 46, at 44. However, it should be noted that another "dysfunc-
tion" immediately appeared: interviewers, in order to improve their statistical performance,
began to "refer" employees temporarily laid off to jobs they knew they would return to before
coming to the employment office.
52 M. CRoziER, supra note 46, at 157.
53 P. Bi .u & W. ScoTT, supra note 46, at 142.
54 M. CRozre, supra note 46, at 151.
55 P. BLAU, supra note 46, at 102; P. BLAu & W. ScoTT, supra note 46, at 103.
56 J. SimoN, ET AL,., PuBLic ADmmisTRATioN 421 (1950).
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tional types of legal control. The same pressures and influences are of course in
operation throughout the entire welfare administration and affect all levels of
management. s7
1. Peer Group
The norms and values of fellow workers substantially influence caseworker
decisions. This may take the form of informal work norms whose violation is
punished through ostracization.58 Such norms prevent competition among work-
ers, helping them to better control their work environment and limit the power
of management. Other values may pertain not to the quantity or quality of work
but to what the group considers a proper balance between compassion for the
client and concern for the public fist. Blau and Scott found that a caseworker
whose individual attitudes were proclient was no more likely to engage in pro-
client behavior if the majority of his peers held anticlient views than an in-
dividual caseworker whose own attitudes were anticlient but whose peers were
proclient. Not surprisingly, the anticient worker in the procient group was
twice as likely to take proclient action as an anticlient caseworker in an anti-
client group.5 9 Blau noted in his public employment study that the peer group
frequently protected its members from the anxiety caused by aggressive clients by
making jokes about such clients. This joking at the client's expense "transformed
inconsiderate treatment of clients from a private exception into a socially ap-
proved practice.''6
The organization's formal structure will either augment or diminish the
force of peer group pressures. A public welfare office lacking a manual of
procedures gives great influence to the older workers since newcomers are de-
pendent on them for information; conversely, the presence of a manual and an
intensive formal orientation will tend to limit the influence of older workers and
increase that of the management.
2. Professional Values
Another pervasive influence bearing on caseworker decisions is professional
social work values. Even though a very small percentage of public assistance
caseworkers have had professional social work training, to a large degree social
work professionals dictated our social welfare practices between the passage of
the Social Security Act and the middle sixties when welfare became a volatile
political issue.61
Most writers assume that professionalization protects the client since inter-
nalized professional standards insulate him from administrative concerns for
57 However, a caveat should be given: some writers have drawn attention to the 'mar-
ginal" nature of a caseworker's role implying that the caseworker's situation is in many ways
unique and not analogous to the rest of the bureaucratic hierarchy. See, e.g., Lipsky, Street-
Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform, 6 URAN AFFAIRS Q. 391 (1971).
58 P. BLAU & W. ScoTT, supra note 46, at 92-93.
59 Id. at 102.
60 P. BLAU, supra note 46, at 111.
61 Moynihan, The Crises in Welfare, 10 Pus. INEREST 3 (1968).
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efficiency and community biases against the poor. 2 One suspects many welfare
recipients might disagree. First, while Blau and Scott did find that caseworkers
with a professional orientation were more "client-oriented," the client-oriented
sample were less willing to relinquish their discretion in favor of the recipient's
autonomy.6" Piven and Cloward also cite an HEW study which discovered
professional-oriented caseworkers were less likely than their nonprofessional col-
leagues to find applicants eligible.6" Keith-Lucas similarly found that the state
department of welfare with high numbers of professional social workers had
more liberal paper requirements than a neighboring state without many profes-
sionals but lower average grants and proportionally fewer poor people on the
rolls. 5 Keith-Lucas adds that perhaps professional social workers apply the same
harsh community values to recipients as nonprofessionals but garb them in
psychological terminology. 8 One tentative conclusion to be drawn from this data
is that while professional values do counteract local community prejudices, the
social work profession has biases of its own in favor of moral supervision rather
than financial support of the poor."
3. The Supervisor
Blau and Scott also found that the supervisor's attitudes exerted great in-
fluence on caseworker decisions. A caseworker was much more likely to be con-
cerned with eligibility procedures if the supervisor shared that concern. 8 The
casework supervisor has two sources of control over the caseworker's decision.
One inheres in the supervisor's position in the formal hierarchy and depends on
the supervisor's ability to affect the caseworker's professional future through
promotion and to overlook certain inconvenient or burdensome aspects of the
caseworker's formal job description. Anthony Downs states that all officials will
exhibit loyalty to those who control their job seniority and promotion. 9 It is
not surprising, then, that the supervisors in the tobacco monopoly Crozier studied
had little control over their subordinates-strict security regulated promotion.
Blau found that supervisors in the public employment agency he studied did not
want statistics to be the sole evaluation of the work performance of subordinates
since such a system would diminish their power.7" A second source of supervisor
control is knowledge, since the supervisor is experienced in the complexity of the
system.
4. Management
It should be obvious that the upper level administrators of a welfare agency
62 P. BLAU & W. SCOTT, supra note 46, at 63.
63 Id. at 103.
64 F. PIVEN & R. CLOwARD, REGULATING THE POOR 176 (1971).
65 A. KErrir-LuCA's, supra note 15, at 179-80.
66 Id. at 123.
67 See J. HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR: WELFARE POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND MORAL-
rrY (1972); R. Lunov, THE PROFESSIONAL ALTRUIST (1965).
68 P. BLAU & W. SCOTT, supra note 46, at 151-52.
69 A. DowNs, supra note 46, at 211.
70 P. BLAu, supra note 46, at 44.
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exert a good deal of influence on how a caseworker performs; they are, after all,
the caseworkers' employers in the conventional sense of the word. This applies
to administrators at both the local and the state levels, the relative degree of con-
trol being determined by how much autonomy the state has given the local unit.
Some writers have emphasized the importance of the local director,7 ' and indeed
a strong-willed local director does have substantial impact on caseworker
behavior. One California county director of the author's acquaintance literally
put a caseworker under house arrest to prevent her from testifying at a judicial
hearing which the director did not consider in the agency's best interest. Another
caseworker who was considered proclient was assigned to an Indian reservation
in a remote corner of the county after being told he was a bad influence on other
workers.
The local director usually controls training and indoctrination, a process
which develops a "bureau philosophy," a set of values newcomers will be ex-
pected to accept without critical examination. He will also have considerable
control over the incentive systems (pay, promotion, etc.) to which caseworkers
are extremely sensitive.
Even in a locally administered system, the state management will have great
influence. The state department will, of course, publish the caseworker's manual
which may or may not grant the caseworker great discretion. The manual may
also focus his attention on restrictive eligibility requirements or emphasize maxi-
mizing service to the recipient.72 The state department will also normally
prescribe the educational requirements for various positions, including the local
director, thereby largely determining who will hold that position. Many local
services depend upon state department aid and local sensitivity to federal re-
quirements will thus to a large extent reflect state policy.
Management's considerable power over the caseworker's decisions may often
be against the client's interests. This management bias sharpens the inevitable
conflict between the individual best interests of recipients and the administrative
needs of a large bureaucracy.7" The higher one goes in the welfare hierarchy,
the more overtly the decisions become political and the more vulnerable ad-
ministrators become to powerful interest groups in which recipients are not likely
to be represented.
5. Community Values
Community values influence caseworker decisions in many subtle yet in-
sidious ways. Social scientists have developed the concept of "status congruence"
to explain the tendency to judge people by external signs, one "low" status sign
signifying all sorts of other unrelated low status characteristics. 7 4 Consequently,
police tend to judge a situation not on the known facts but on the status of the
parties involved. As a result, Blacks and Chicanos are apprehended not on the
71 Derthick, supra note 16, at 256.
72 A. KErTH-LUCAS, supra note 15, at 181, 201.
73 P. BLAU & W. SCOTT, supra note 46, at 44.
74 G. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS 250 (R. Merton ed. 1961).
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basis of their overt behavior but because of their lower class status.75 Since all
welfare recipients are by definition poor, they face prejudgment by the com-
munity (and the caseworker) before the individual facts of each situation are
known.
All of the other actors discussed above as important influences on the case-
worker's decision are likewise affected by community values. The caseworker
may also consciously or unconsciously weigh the effect casework decisions will
have on the public's image of the welfare agency and, derivatively, of the case-
worker. Caseworkers in southern states have infused the vague regulations on
"suitable home" and "substitute father" with local social stereotypes,"6 and case-
workers in Massachusetts have applied traditional middle-class morality in deal-
ings with recipients." Other caseworkers have also admitted being sensitive to
local public opinion."
IV. Resolution of Bureaucratic Dilemmas
This analysis demonstrates that the caseworker often faces a dilemma
created by conflicting pressures and influences.
The simplest form of dilemma occurs when the accomplishment of two or
more ends depends on the same scarce means, since the more one end is
attained the more the other must be sacrificed, and the choice how to dis-
tribute the means poses a dilemma.7 9
If the caseworker only has 10 minutes to spend with an AFDC mother, he or
she is faced with the dilemma of deciding whether to spend that time determining
if the family is entitled to a special need grant for school clothes or if the mother
has received any excess income which must be deducted from the grant. Or
perhaps the caseworker has to decide whether to visit the family at all or spend
the time making extremely neat entries in the file, a trait which his or her super-
visor may value highly.
These examples are merely illustrative; the point is that often the caseworker
is caught between conflicting desires of different groups. This does not bode well
for the recipient since "[t]he outcome of dilemmas in which the interests of vari-
ous groups conflict... tends to be determined by the distribution of resources and
power [among the groups]."8"
One actor omitted from our list of influences on caseworker decisions is the
recipient himself. The omission is partly for purposes of emphasis since the re-
cipient's desires are obviously not totally removed from the caseworker's mind;
otherwise, there would be no need for the peer group protecting the worker
from client hostility.8" In fact, the caseworker's anguish at not being able to
75 J. WLSON, VA MTIES oF POLIM BEHAVIOR 37 (1968).
76 W. BELL, supra note 28, at 181.
77 Derthick, supra note 16, at 247.
78 A. KEITH-LucAs, supra note 15, at 225-27.
79 P. BLAU, THE ORGANIZATION OF ACADEMIC WORK 270 (1973).
80 Id.
81 P. BLAU & W. ScoTT, supra note 46, at 111.
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really help the recipient is cited as one reason for caseworker withdrawal from
contact with the recipient. 2 However, it is just this ability to withdraw which
accents the unique position of the welfare recipient as compared with clients of
other public bureaucracies. With many public bureaucracies, we fear just the
opposite abuse, that the public regulatory agency has been captured by its
clientele.8 3 The reason for the distinctive position of the welfare recipient is no
mystery; as a group, recipients do not have sufficient cohesiveness and financial
power to be a politically potent force. To make welfare responsive, we must
devise a system which grants power to the welfare recipient similar to that held
by other client groups in our political system.
Bureaucratic dilemmas, of course, must be resolved; this occurs either by
compromise or by suppression of one of the groups involved. Too often com-
promise comes at the expense of the recipient. An analogous situation existed
earlier in this century in labor relations. The individual worker lacked the power
to bargain effectively with his employer; the employer normally had sufficient
power to prevent organization of the workers. The legislative solution was the
National Labor Relations Act which required the employer to allow employee
organization and required him to bargain with the employees' union. The
legislature intervened, not to force a substantive solution to the crisis, but rather
to change the structure of the confrontation so as to increase the power of the
employee. Once the structure of the confrontation was altered, the dynamic of
the bargaining process itself protected worker interests. We need a similar inter-
vention to change the structure of public bureaucracies in order to make them
more responsive.
The extent of legislative intervention necessary to redress the present im-
balance of power is a more difficult question since responsiveness to recipient
desires is not the only desirable value in a bureaucracy. The recipient cannot be
the sole determinant of welfare eligibility. In fact, the bureaucratic dilemma
merely reflects the conflicting missions the greater society has assigned to the
bureaucracy. The welfare bureaucracy must grant benefits to all eligible ap-
plicants but must simultaneously be frugal with the public purse; it must respect
the recipient's dignity but also guard against possible fraud; must give in-
dividualized services yet be evenhanded in dealing with all recipients. These
conflicting missions create an organizational schizophrenia. The problem, how-
ever, is not this conflict between the various missions but the present organiza-
tional structure which overemphasizes some missions at the expense of others.
The welfare bureaucracy emphasizes economy at the expense of responsiveness.
The answer lies in restructuring the organization to strike a proper balance
between the conflicting missions.
V. Solutions: Strategies for Intervention
It is misleading to speak of solutions to the problems of welfare administra-
tion. Some distortion of any legislative policy must occur as it is filtered through
82 Handier & Hollingsworth, supra note 22, at 1176.
83 See Wilson, The Dead Hand of Regulation, 25 Pun. INTEREST 39 (1971).
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the organizational apparatus set up to administer it. Even if there were one
consistent national welfare policy, there would of necessity be some misconduct
in administration since the program would be administered by self-interested
individuals. However, we do not have one welfare policy in the United States
but a national program reflecting different policies, many in conflict with each
other. We wish to insure that those truly in need receive an adequate level of
income; we wish that those who are capable of self-support have an incentive to
leave the program; we wish that individuals similarly situated will be treated
equitably; we wish that the program be run economically so as not to place too
great a tax burden upon the rest of society. So long as welfare administrators are
attempting to adjust these conflicting goals, there will be welfare abuse; and
since these goals themselves reflect an ambivalence which we as a nation have
toward those who are poor, it is unrealistic to expect the conflicts to disappear.
This commentary will therefore resist the temptation to propose any ideal
solution. It will focus on more practical proposals for legislation and litigation.
For instance, there is no doubt that a "negative income tax" or "guaranteed
minimum income" would improve welfare administration by removing many
discretionary abuses.84 However, the fate of Senator McGovern's welfare pro-
posals in 1972 and even of President Nixon's rather modest movement toward
a guaranteed income in his Family Assistance Plan demonstrate that the "nega-
tive income tax" is an idea whose time has not yet come.85
Similarly, litigation is not a fully effective reform tool. The abuses tend to
have very low visibility. As soon as one moves from published regulations to the
murkier area of administrative practices, very real problems of proof arise; more-
over, there are difficult problems of framing proper remedies even where the
abuse can be proven. For example, how does one draft an injunction requiring
caseworkers to treat welfare recipients courteously and to give them emotional
support in their attempts to qualify for assistance? How does one argue for a
contempt citation for violation of such an injunction? However, this merely
proves that just as comprehensive legislative reform is preferable to piecemeal
legislative reform, piecemeal legislative reform is normally preferable to judicial
attempts at reform. When even piecemeal legislative reform is unavailable, how-
ever, the courts become the only forum to which the poor and their representa-
tives have access.
Perhaps the problem is not with litigation per se but with the type of law-
suit traditionally brought. Rather than attack punitive regulations, lawsuits
should attempt to change the bureaucracy's internal structure so that such a
punitive regulation is never issued. Since some vague regulations are inevitable,
employment discrimination suits brought to change hiring procedures will insure
that the workers applying those vague regulations will be less likely to use the
vagueness as a weapon against clients.
One problem in the traditional welfare lawsuit has been its tendency to
undermine attempts to organize recipients. However, a lawsuit geared toward
84 See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); THE GUARANTEED INCOME (R.
Theobald ed. 1966).
85 See D. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME (1973).
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the creation of a client advisory board creates a forum in which recipients can
exert their power. In fact, this lawsuit makes the attorney dependent upon the
recipients he represents because the strategy can only succeed if the advisory
board exercises its power; this can only come about by actions of the recipients
themselves.
It is indeed ironic that so many of the reforms which would make welfare
bureaucracy more responsive (advisory boards, use of paraprofessionals, and
bilingual aides) are already written into federal law and regulations. The
bureaucracy, of course, has little incentive to implement them imaginatively.
All that is needed is recipient pressure and lawsuits are an excellent tool for apply-
ing this pressure.
A. Removing Discretion
1. Deleting Unrelated Eligibility Requirements
The "paramount" goal of our national AFDC program is to protect de-
pendent children, defined by the Social Security Act to be those who are (1)
needy and (2) deprived of parental support."8 Therefore, all eligibility require-
ments not directly related to need or dependency should be viewed with grave
suspicion. States have created additional eligibility requirements which have
discriminated between potential recipients on the grounds of "moral worthiness"
and racial background." While some of the most blatant nonneed conditions
have been struck down, ingenious administrators always devise new variations
on the same theme.8" Here is one area in which litigation has proven more
fruitful than legislative reform. Time and again, courts have invalidated
eligibility requirements unrelated to need on constitutional"9 or statutory
grounds.9" In the King-Townsend-Remillard line of cases, the Supreme Court
seems to have interpreted § 406 (a) of the Social Security Act as creating a
statutory "right to welfare" which the states cannot diminish by adding eligibility
requirements not specifically authorized by the Act itself.9'
86 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968) ; 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
87 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-23 (1968).
88 The recent California case, Alice v. State Dep't of Social Welfare, 37 Cal. App. 3d 998,
112 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1974), provides a good example of an unnecessary nonneed eligibility
condition. In Alice a pregnant, emancipated minor applied for AFDC in order to obtain an
abortion under the related Medi-Cal benefits. She sought no cash grant and the state statute
prohibited the welfare department from requesting her parents to pay for the abortion; yet her
application was turned down because of her refusal to consent to the welfare department's wish
that they contact her parents to inform them of her pregnancy. The department persisted
even though she gave them all the information they requested about her parents; she told
them that one was dead, the other was on welfare, and even the address of the mother. One
has to question what objective the county had in contacting the girl's parents other than to
discourage her application.
89 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
90 Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282(1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd sub nom. Carleson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 (1971); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp.
761 (D. Conn. 1969).
91 See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971):
Thus, King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of congressional authori-
zation for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legis-
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As administrators devise new forms of nonneed eligibility conditions, legal
services attorneys should challenge them under the King-Townsend-Remillard
theory. However, not all welfare conditions unrelated to need are vulnerable to
legal challenges. Congress has become increasingly concerned with some highly
publicized "welfare abuses" and will insist on some form of control which
responds to politically sensitive areas such as the alleged presence of "malingerers"
on welfare.
One possible solution is to utilize voluntary programs in these areas which
would give recipients incentives to cooperate with authorities. This approach is
especially valuable in the area of collecting support payments from deserting
spouses.2 At present there is no incentive for a mother to cooperate with efforts
to collect support from her husband. First, she may have good cause to fear re-
prisal from the angry husband. Second, any amount received will be deducted
dollar for dollar from her welfare grant. Finally, if the support payments are
made directly to her, she may be caught in a cycle of late payments much less
dependable than a regular welfare check. The father also has no incentive to
cooperate since he knows that whatever he pays only replaces state money and
in no way improves the lives of his family. However, a program which would
offer a "finder's fee" to the mother by permitting her to retain a percentage of
the support payments she receives without a corresponding reduction in her
grant would provide an incentive both to her cooperation and the father's."3
lative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance
under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore in-
valid under the Supremacy Clause.
It should be noted that two Supreme Court cases have upheld state eligibility require-
ments not expressly authorized by the Act. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), upheld
a New York state requirement that a recipient must permit a caseworker to make a "home
visit" to check eligibility. New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405 (1973), authorized the states to operate supplementary work programs in addition
to the programs mandated by the Social Security Act. The Wyman case, however, antedated
Townsend and the opinion was limited to consideration of whether the "home visit" require-
ment imposed by New York violated the Fourth Amendment stricture against unreasonable
searches. The Dublino case distinguished the King-Townsend-Remillard line by pointing out
that § 402(a)(19) of the Social Security Act specifically requires a federal work program("WIN"), the question in Dublino being whether the state was allowed to operate a supple-
mentary work program in addition to the federal program. However, on a different level, there
seems to be an unarticulated philosophical division on the Court as to whether welfare is an
"entitlement" or public charity. In this regard, compare Mr. Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion in Wyman ("One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and
expects to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public, when it is
the provider, rightly expects the same." 400 U.S. at 319) with Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent,
equating welfare benefits with all other forms of government largess, such as farm subsidies.
400 U.S. at 326. There is a need for scholarship attempting to better explicate the philosophi-
cal basis for a "right" to welfare. For such an attempt based upon John Rawls' theory ofjustice, see Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls
Theory of justice, 121 U. PA. L. Rv. 962 (1973).
92 The Act requires the states to undertake a program to collect support from deserting
spouses. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (17) (1970). This provision, however, has not been interpreted
as permitting the states to force cooperation from the mother as a condition of eligibility.
Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd sub nom. Carleson v. Taylor, 404 U.S.
980 (1971).
93 It is interesting to note that Senator Russell Long, a conservative in welfare matters,




2. Requiring Specificity in Remaining Eligibility Requirements
Deleting eligibility requirements unrelated to need or dependency narrows
the discretion which the caseworker has over the recipient and correspondingly
the power to abuse that discretion. Of course, not all eligibility conditions un-
related to need can be deleted; the society which funds the program insists upon
them, but they can be drafted with enough specificity to notify the caseworker
and the recipient of their respective duties.
Americans firmly believe that welfare should be for those who are unable
to work, not for those who choose to remain idle. This is a reasonable position
in the abstract, but it oversimplifies the problem of employment in our economy.
First, there are simply not enough jobs to employ everyone who is "employable."
Second, while social science data overwhelmingly support the proposition that the
poor really do want to work,9" there is evidence that a series of disappointing job
experiences has a negative effect on the attachment to the labor market of a
sizable portion of our poor population.9" The combination of a scarcity of jobs,
the ambivalence of some recipients toward work, and vaguely worded welfare
work regulations administered by caseworkers with strong moral views toward
work results in a great deal of welfare abuse. Narrowly drawn regulations in
this area will put the recipient on notice as to what his or her duties are and
limit the caseworker's discretion to impose his or her own moral values on
recipients.
California's "job search" regulation is an excellent example of a vaguely
phrased duty which invites administrative abuse: "An applicant . . . shall
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the county that he has been and is available for
and actively seeking employment."9 The parallel requirement under federal law
finds a recipient ineligible if he or she has:
refused without good cause to accept employment in which he or she is able
to engage which is offered through the public employment offices of the
State, or is otherwise offered by an employer if the offer of such employer is
determined, after notification by him, to be a bona fide offer of employ-
ment.9 7
Federal law thus requires a determination that (1) a definite bona fide offer was
made and (2) the recipient refused to accept the offer. Here are concrete acts
94 See L. GOODWIN, DO THE POOR WANT TO WORK? (1972).
95 See E. LIEBOW, TALLY'S CORNER: A STUDY OF NEGRO STREETCORNER MEN (1967).
96 CDBP Reg. § 41-407.11. Such broad welfare regulations may well be vulnerable to
constitutional attack under the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine. Imprecise regulations deprive
the recipient of notice and make review of official action by the court extremely difficult. Also,
imprecise regulations relating to such matters as "bizarre mode of dress" may impinge upon
first amendment rights. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra. These are all defects which
the vagueness doctrine is designed to prevent. See Note, Vagueness Doctrine in Federal Courts:
A Focus on the Military, Prison, and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855 (1974). See
also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), where the Court struck down prison regula-
tions censoring prisoners' mail, stating: "These regulations fairly invited prison officials and
employees to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as standards for prisoner mail
censorship." Id. at 415.
97 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (F) (1970).
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capable of proof as opposed to the California regulation which places the re-
cipient at the mercy of whatever the county deems "satisfactory."
The California job search regulation also unfairly shifts the burden of proof
to the recipient. It is his duty to "demonstrate to the satisfaction of the county"
that he is looking for a job. The recipient also bears a financial burden; there is
no reimbursement for expenses. There is no duty that the administrator find a
job for the recipient. He merely tells the recipient to keep looking; once the
recipient becomes discouraged because there are no jobs available, he is subject
to termination. One way to discourage the administrator from forcing the
recipient to look for nonexistent jobs would be to require that the administrator
pay some "costs." For example, if the welfare department were required to
reimburse recipients for out-of-pocket expenses incurred in "job search" activities
(for example, gasoline), there would be less incentive to send a woman on a
20-mile round trip to look for a job which the department should know does not
exist. 98
Related to the problems of vagueness and shifting the burden of proof is
that of presumptions. Irrebuttable presumptions are constitutionally invalid.99
Some rebuttable presumptions such as presuming the "willfullness" of failure to
report income0 0 until the recipient proves otherwise are patently unfair and
may also violate due process if there is "no rational connection between the facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed"'1
0
3. Simplifying Need Requirements and Budget Computations
One traditional form of controlling discretion has been to promulgate
complex, detailed regulations. Paradoxically, such regulations only breed more
discretion because the complexity becomes incomprehensible both to the ad-
ministrator and the recipient. Some welfare abuse comes from honest mistakes
made by inexperienced welfare workers administering a complex system.' The
complexity of the system not only creates errors but also prevents recipients from
detecting them. A system based on less complex need calculations, a flat grant
structure, and standardized work deductions would be both more efficient and
more humane.0 3 Recipients will be more willing to challenge reductions in aid
if they better understand what their rights are within the system.
98 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. It appears that such a reimbursement would
now be required by the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (1970). See Shea v.
Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974).
99 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
100 See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
101 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 466 (1943); see also Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6 (1969).
102 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 322 n.11 (1971), where Mr. Justice Blackmun
quotes from an amicus brief filed by a social workers' union which states: "Caseworkers are
either badly trained or untrained and that [g]enerally, a caseworker is not only poorly trained,
but also young and inexperienced . .. ."
103 See the discussion of the history of the California "flat grant system" in Cooper v.
Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 861-67, 115 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-5, 524 P.2d 97, 100-01 (1974). The
United States Supreme Court, in Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974), has ruled that
standardized work expense deductions are invalid as applied to recipients whose work-related




A basic structural problem leading to abuse is the lack of market controls
over public bureaucracies.' The customer of a business exercises control through
his discretion to shop elsewhere or not at all. The customers of public bureau-
cracies have no such control because the bureaucracy is a monopoly dealing in
essential benefits and services. This is especially true of bureaucracies which
serve the poor: welfare, public housing, public schools, and public hospitals. The
suggestion is to reinstate market-type controls where possible and to create other
forms of countervailing power which will maximize responsiveness to legitimate
client demands.
The public welfare caseworker's job can be subdivided into two basic func-
tions: determining eligibility and providing social services. The determination of
eligibility is basically clerical in nature. The social services function includes the
provision of family services in order to help the family obtain "capability for
the maximum self-support and personal independence,"'05 and child welfare
services to "protect and promote the welfare of children."' ' 6 This is the tradi-
tional province of the social worker. The conflict between the policing role of
eligibility determination and the helping role of providing social services has
often been noted. 7 Federal regulations now require that the two functions be
separately administered.0 8
Of course, a welfare recipient cannot be permitted to shop around in search
of the eligibility worker who applies eligibility standards in the most lenient
manner; but to permit the recipient to choose his or her social services worker
should improve both recipient morale and caseworker responsiveness since the
worker will be forced, in a sense, to compete for the recipient's "trade." Drucker
refers to a variation on this concept as "socialist competition":'"O The govern-
ment sets certain minimum performance standards through a licensing agency
and thereafter permits the eligible consumer a choice between providers. The
poor presently have a similar choice of the provider of medical services under
the Medicaid program."0 To convert present social services workers from em-
ployees of a public agency into independent contractors would require a sub-
stantial restructuring of the public welfare delivery system. However, such a
drastic restructuring is not necessary. One could instill a similar dynamic by
having the recipient choose between various welfare workers already employed
by the agency; the social services worker who was not carrying his or her pro-
allowance would be permissible so long as those with greater expenses could make an indi-
vidual claim for a larger reimbursement. 416 U.S. at 265.
104 P. DRUCKER, supra note 1, at 141.
105 42 U.S.C. § 606(d) (1970).
106 42 U.S.C. § 625 (1970).
107 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971): "It is also true that the caseworker's
posture in the home visit is perhaps, in a sense, both rehabilitative and investigative." See also
Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Welfare Home Visit, 79 YALE L.J. 746 (1970).
108 45 C.F.R. § 205.102 (1973).
109 P. DRUCKER, supra note 1, at 163.
110 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a) (23) (1970).
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portion of the work load would feel peer pressure to perform better and would
also be subject to termination.
C. Countervailing Forces Where Market Controls Are Inappropriate
1. Independent Officers
In addition to market controls, or where they are inappropriate, other con-
trols are possible. For instance, some police forces have adopted what James Q.
Wilson described as a "service style' in which they perceive themselves as selling
police services to the public.'11 Understandably, these police forces cannot permit
the suspect to choose whether he will be arrested and who will arrest him. How-
ever, they do allow the "consumer" some input by publicizing that any officer
who is the subject of five or more complaints will not be promoted. A system
which permitted recipients to voice their views on caseworker courtesy and help-
fulness would perform a similar function.
One possibility would be to create an independent officer charged with
monitoring the responsiveness of the welfare administration to legitimate client
desires." 2 Client evaluations of caseworker performance could be solicited on
an anonymous basis. The results of these evaluations could be recorded in em-
ployment dossiers and considered at the time of promotions. Perhaps the client
evaluations could even be made public. Nor need the incentive be merely nega-
tive; awards of merit could be made to caseworkers judged especially helpful by
their clientele. Special attention should be given to applicants who are denied
aid; spot checks could be made to see if these denials were indeed proper or
resulted from caseworker apathy or discourtesy.
The officer must be independent of the bureaucracy which he attempts
to monitor. Perhaps the officer and his staff could be made accountable to a
state welfare advisory committee." 3 In California, the auditor general's function
could be expanded to include reports on the responsiveness as well as the fiscal
soundness of state administration. In fact, the auditor general presently has
authority to do "performance audits."' 4
2. Governing Boards with Significant Recipient Representation
A complementary approach would be to create governing boards with sub-
stantial client representation which would have both specific powers and the
staff to utilize those powers effectively. The creation of recipient governing
boards is based on a political rather than an economic model of control. Bureauc-
racies become more responsive to their clientele when the clients become more
involved in their own governance, just as national governments became more
responsive to the worker as the franchise was extended." 5 It is unfortunate that
111 J. WILSON, supra note 75, at 205.
112 For a general discussion of the European experience with "ombudsmen," see W. GELL-
HORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS (1967).
113 See text accompanying notes 115-22 infra.
114 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 10500 (Cam. Supp. 1974).
115 R. DAHL, PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 23 (1971).
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most discussion of this approach has been under the rubric of "community
control," a term which connotes an all-or-nothing choice. Participation is better
viewed as a continuum of potential control; the goal is client input, not client
control."'
Once again, federal law presently offers at least a partial solution. Federal
regulations require that advisory committees be established at the state and,
where feasible, local levels." 7 These committees must "have adequate oppor-
tunity for meaningful participation" in program administration, including "fur-
therance of recipient participation in the program of the agency."""" Recipients,
or their representatives, must constitute at least one-third of the membership of
these committees," 9 and these committees must be provided with staff assis-
tance. 2 Financial arrangements must be made to permit recipients to partic-
ipate in the committee's work."' Little has been done to carry out the law be-
cause the bureaucracy has a natural aversion to outsiders looking over its institu-
tional shoulder. Legal services attorneys and their clients should make sure that
these committees are set up and that their membership is not handpicked by the
bureaucracy.
While the federal requirements are an excellent starting point, these govern-
ing boards should be granted additional powers: (1) the presence of a com-
mittee member at all staff meetings, (2) advance notice of all proposed regula-
tions and staff memoranda and a right to comment before their adoption, (3)
access to competent legal counsel (at the local level, this could be provided by
legal services attorneys), and (4) participation in the process of choosing high-
level agency personnei.
Often in the past governing boards have not been effective controls on
administrators, but these have tended to be boards without effective powers and
resources to use those powers. We cannot expect people, poor or otherwise, to
actively participate on boards which are designed to be ineffective. Also, too
often the poor and their attorneys have been insensitive to the tactical advantages
which control of such boards gives to them even in the face of an uncooperative
administration. The official status of a board makes its actions more "news-
worthy" to the media and the resources which it controls (staff, access to records,
etc.) can be used to expose an uncooperative administration as well as to co-
operate with a friendly administration.
One persistent criticism of community control proposals has been that client
boards tend to be subject to manipulation by small pressure groups not truly
representative of the poor. The low turnout at OEO Community Action Pro-
gram elections is often cited in support of this proposition. 22 It is true that the
116 See Kalodner, The Right to Participate, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS (N. Dorsen ed.
1971).
117 45 C.F.R. § 220.4(a) (1) (1973). See Arizona State Dep't of Public Welfare v. Dep't
of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 449 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1971).
118 45 C.F.R § 220.4(a) (1) (1973).
119 45 C.F.R. § 220.4(a) (2) (1973).
120 45 C.F.R. § 220.4(a) (3) (1973).
121 45 C.F.R. § 220.4(a) (4) (1973).
122 R. KRAMER, PARTIIPATION OF THE POOR: COMPARATIVE COMMUNITIES CASE STUDIES




limited scope of a governing board's power and the basic reluctance of many
poor people to identify themselves with other recipients limit effective partici-
pation. However, to some degree these defects should be remedied by the very
fact of granting specific powers to the board and by having it include both recip-
ients and interested professionals.
It would be a mistake to believe that a governing board must be perfectly
representative in order to effectively represent the clients' interest. Few would
argue that the oligarchies controlling most labor unions truly represent their
membership as required by a pure democratic model; but unions have been
very successful in protecting the interests of their members against management.
In other words, the presence of a countervailing force makes the bureacracy
more responsive, even if the force is not entirely representative of its constituency.
3. Civil Damage Actions Against Recalcitrant Administrators
While many, and perhaps most, welfare abuses stem from the vagueness
and complexity of the system itself, other abuses are plainly deliberate.2 3 The
traditional litigation technique has been to sue for declaratory, and injunctive
relief. However, administrators can find judicial declarations ambiguous and
read injunctions extremely narrowly; courts are most reluctant to use the con-
tempt sanction." 4
Some might maintain that the bad press an administrator suffers if an
intentional abuse is publicized through a lawsuit will have some effect; however,
welfare is one area in which publicizing administrative abuses may be ineffective
and, in some cases, even counterproductive. The political context in which our
welfare system operates is such that publicizing blatantly illegal administrative
practices may actually improve an administrator's political position, creating a
public image that he or she is not soft on "welfare chiselers."
If injunctions and publicity are inadequate, perhaps an action for damages
against the individual administrator would be more effective. One could sue on
tort principles in state court 25 or as a § 1983 action in federal court.'28 The
123 E.g., Cooper v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 864, 115 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6, 524 P.2d 97, 102
(1974):
In promulgating the regulation in question here, the department has ignored this
fundamental principle of administrative law [i.e., administrative regulations that alter
or amend the statutes are void] and has arrogated to itself the authority to reject
explicit legislative determinations, an authority which is completely incompatible with
the basic premise on which our democratic system of government rests.
124 The case of Doe v. Carleson, 356 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1973), presents a good
example. Earlier, in Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1971), a three-judge
federal court had issued a preliminary injunction ordering the state not to require execution of
a nonsupport complaint against an absent spouse as a condition of the family's eligibility for
welfare. The state director of social welfare then wrote a letter to all counties advising them
that recipient could no longer be terminated for refusing to cooperate with the district attor-
ney, but then added: "It is NOT required that an applicant or recipient be told that she has
no obligation to answer questions or to be interviewed by the district attorney concerning these
matters, and she should NOT be so advised." 356 F. Supp. at 755. Judge Peckham noted
that "this position suggests a lack of candor that borders on the contemptuous," but no con-
tempt citation was issued. Id.
125 E.g., Ramos v. County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421, 484 P.2d 93
(1971).
126 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974): "[D]amages against individual




damage remedy could be joined with a claim for equitable relief. So long as
the damages proved are neither speculative nor excessive, courts may well be
willing to grant awards. A relatively modest potential liability against any indi-
vidual administrator should have a dramatic deterrent effect on deliberate
abuse well beyond the individual case. Once again, the principle is clear; just
as caseworkers in some situations are deterred from a liberal construction of eligi-
bility requirements because of fear of displeasing their supervisors, they can be
made leery of illegally restrictive interpretations by fear of personal financial
liability.
D. Restructuring Personnel Policies
Another complementary approach is to restructure personnel policies so as
to hire workers who will be spontaneously more responsive to client needs.
Employment of more paraprofessionals, more minorities, and more bilingual
personnel will help span the economic and cultural chasm between the agency
and the recipient. A former recipient may be better qualified to help the poor
than his middle-class colleague. A B.A. in English literature may little help a
caseworker to deal effectively with the everyday problems of a poor black family.
The experience with restructuring jobs so as to allow more employment of
nonprofessionals is still scanty, but preliminary results in the welfare field are
most promising. 2 7 Observers of nonprofessional welfare aides in both California
and New York conclude that they have improved service because of their better
communication with recipients and greater responsiveness to client needs; they
provide a role model for recipient emulation. 2 ' Furthermore, there are several
legal precedents which can be used to force a restructuring of hiring policies.
1. Federal Law on the Employment of Paraprofessionals
Section 402 (a) (5) (B) of the Social Security Act requires states to provide
"for the training and effective use of paid subprofessional staff, with particular
emphasis on the full-time or part-time employment of recipients and other per-
sons of low income, as community service aides.' 2  Federal regulations under
this section require the institution of recruitment methods, the establishment of
training programs, the maintenance of job progression ladders to higher-paying
positions, and a demonstration of increasing utilization of subprofessional staff
on an annual basis."' There has been some use of paraprofessionals as com-
munity service aides in welfare departments, but welfare clients and their attor-
neys could spur faster action through negotiation and litigation. They could
influence recruitment policies so as to maximize the hiring of sympathetic per-
sonnel. Governing boards could also help administer the recruitment program.
127 Goldberg, Untrained Neighborhood Workers in a Social-Work Program, in Nuw
CAREERS FOR THE PooR 125 (A. Pearl & F. Riessman ed. 1965); Up FRoM POVERTY (F.
Riessman & H. Popper ed. 1968).
128 Brager, The Indigenous Social Work Technician, in UP FROM PovErTY 80 (F. Riessman
& H. Popper ed. 1968); Elston, Public Welfare: The Breath of Change, in UP FROM POVERTY
(F. Riessman & H. Popper ed. 1968).
129 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(5)(B) (1970).
130 45 C.F.R. § 220.6 (1973).
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2. Title VII Actions on Employment Discrimination
The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co!" invalidated testing
and other selection procedures which statistically discriminated against minorities
unless the procedures were shown by the employer to be job related:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in application. The touchstone is busi-
ness necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is pro-
hibited.32
If public welfare employee selection techniques' result in a statistically dispro-
portionate number of whites being hired over Blacks, Indians, and Chicanos,
the burden of defending the selection process passes to the employer. Some public
agencies, such as fire departments and police departments,"' have been unable
to justify their procedures as performance related and have had strong affirmative
relief decreed against them.
3. Title VI Actions to Require Employment of Bilingual Aides
The Supreme Court case of Lau v. Nichols"' provides a basis to require
the employment of more bilingual personnel. In Lau, the Supreme Court inter-
preted § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"'7 to require bilingual education for
non-English-speaking schoolchildren of Chinese descent. Section 601 bans dis-
crimination based on the grounds of race, color, or national origin in "any pro-
gram or activity receiving federal financial assistance." The Court reasoned that
children who are unable to communicate with their teachers because of a lan-
guage barrier are not receiving the benefits of the federally financed education
program. If the lack of bilingual teachers denies educational benefits to non-
English-speaking children, then the absence of bilingual welfare workers also
deprives non-English-speaking recipients of the full benefits of the federally
financed welfare program."'
California statutory law also lends support to litigation requiring more
employment of bilingual employees. California Government Code §§ 7291 and
7292 require that "a sufficient number of qualified bilingual persons" be em-
ployed "in public contact positions or as interpreters assisting those in such posi-
131 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1607 et seq. (1973).
132 401 U.S. at 431.
133 In California the state personnel board sets personnel standards on a "merit" basis. CAL.
Gov'r CODE § 19800 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1974).
134 E.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971); Western Addition Community
Organization v. Alioto, 360 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
135 E.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 354 F.
Supp. 778 (D. Conn. 1973).
136 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
137 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et seq. (1970).
138 It should be noted that Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201, 512
P.2d 833 (1973), holds that termination notices to welfare recipients who speak only Spanish
need not be in Spanish, but the Guerrero case antedates Lau, and the attack in Guerrero was
based solely upon constitutional grounds.
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tions." The Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare recently notified California that an estimated 80 percent of Cali-
fornia recipients who spoke Spanish as their primary language were being served
by staff who did not speak Spanish."'
VI. Conclusion
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago contains a grisly illustration
of the frailty of any attempt to reform a bureaucracy.4 ' When the Soviet state
security police come to pull an unsuspecting citizen out of bed in the middle of
the night, perhaps never to return to his home, they are accompanied by a civil-
ian witness. Evidently, the requirement of a civilian witness had been instituted
long ago as a form of control on the police. The hope of deterring the police
soon vanished, but the regulation remained; the witness is forced to accompany
the police on their nocturnal raids.
While there is no such thing as a perfectly functioning bureaucracy, some
bureaucracies do perform better than others. Certainly a welfare bureaucracy
which has both concrete and simple regulations, which is subject to the scrutiny
of an independent officer and the input of a client advisory board, which is
manned by personnel who are more sympathetic to and more knowledgeable
about the problems of their clients, will perform better than the bureaucracies
which presently administer welfare. Both legislators and attorneys representing
welfare recipients should devise and implement strategies to bring about such a
system.
139 Letter from Peter E. Holmes, Director, HEW Office for Civil Rights, to David B.
Swoap, Director, California Department of Social Welfare, November 15, 1973.
140 A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIP3ELAGO 4-5 (1974).
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